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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Case No. 900324

LOUIE E. SIMS,
Pet i t ioner/Appellant,

REPLY BRIEF
OF PETITIONER

v.
COLLECTION DIVISION OF THE
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent/Appellee.
POINT I

THE
FOURTH
AMENDMENT
EXCLUSIONARY
RULE
APPLIES TO ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP TAX PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.
Appellee asserts a three part argument to support its
contention that the exclusionary rule does not apply to illegal
drug stamp

tax proceedings.

Appellee

argues

first

that the

proceedings are civil in nature; second, the exclusionary rule
does not apply to civil proceedings;

and, finally, the policies

underlying the exclusionary rule make it inapplicable to such
proceedings.
ATHE ILLEGAL DRUG TAX STAMP PROCEEDINGS ARE
QUASI-CRIMINAL IN NATURE AND ARE SUBJECT TO
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S EXCLUSIONARY RULE.
Appellee urges this court to hold that the proceedings
and resulting tax and penalties described in Utah Code Annotated
§59-19-101

et. seq.

(1953, as

amended) are purely

civil in

nature.
taxes

Appellee first supports this position by claiming that
are

imposed

on

other

illegal

activities

bootlegging, gambling, extortion and fraud.
been held

to be civil

in nature.

such

as

Those taxes have

However, the distinction

between those situations and the illegal drug tax stamp is that
those tax proceedings address the issue of the income derived
from the illegal activities.

Such proceedings relate to the tax

due and owing if that same income were derived from legitimate
means.

The tax stamp assessment and penalties are based on the

nature and quantity of the illegal substances involved.

The

nature of the activity that gives rise to the illegal drug stamp
tax are the manufacture, production, shipment, transportation,
importation or possession of a controlled substance.

In other

words, the drug stamp tax and penalty are not related to income.
Rather, the tax and penalty are imposed solely on the alleged
illegal activity.
Appellee

next argues that the test given

in United

States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980) results in the conclusion
that

tax stamp

decided
water

proceedings

1

in nature.

The

issue

in Ward was whether the penalty for pollution to the
system

was

sufficiently

Amendment protections.
civil

are civil

penalty

statute

punitive

to

intrude

on

Fifth

The court of appeals had held that the
was

quasi-criminal

in

nature.

Utah Code Annotated §59-19-105(1)(1953, as amended).

In

concluding no Fifth Amendment

protections were

implicated the

Court distinguished a forfeiture case, Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886).

Boyd was distinguished on the basis that

there was no correlation between the damages sustained and the
amount

of property

penalties

were

pollutants.

subject

correlated

The Court

to the forfeiture.
to

the

cost

of

In Ward the

cleanup

of

the

also noted that a factor of critical

importance in Boyd was that the criminal and civil sanctions were
provided in the same statute.

In Ward the civil and criminal

statutes were enacted seventy

years apart

and were found in

different statutes.
The Court in Ward then went on to rely on a test from
Kennedy

v. Mendoza-Martinez,

372 U.S. 144 (1963).
Appellee
quoted the seven factors from that test 3 but did not analyze the

Utah illegal drug tax stamp statutes in light of those factors.
Although

not

all

of

these

factors

apply

to

the

tax

stamp

2
Boyd was a civil forfeiture case where the Supreme Court first
indicated that the exclusionary rule may apply to Fourth
Amendment violations.
3
Brief of appellee at 7.

-3-

statutes,

several

are

applicable.

First,

a

substantial

monetary penalty for the commission of a crime, such as that
associated

with

the

regarded as a fine.
Second,

the

acts

drug

tax

stamp,

has

historically

been

A fine is obviously a form of punishment.
that

give

rise

to

the

tax

assessment—

manufacturing, producing, shipping, transporting,

importing or

possessing controlled substances —all require an awareness that
can be equated to "knowledge" or "intention" as defined in the

Those factors quoted in appellee's brief are:
[1] Whether
the
sanction
involves
an
affirmative disability or restraint, [2]
whether it has historically been regarded as
a punishment, [3] whether it comes into play
only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether
its operation will promote the traditional
aims
of
punishment—retribution
and
deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which
it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an
alternative
purpose
to
which
it
may
rationally be connected is assignable for it,
and [7] whether it appears excessive in
relation to the inquiry, are all relevant to
the inquiry and may often point in differing
directions. [emphasis in original, footnotes
ommitted]
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-9.
5

Utah Code Annotated §59-19-105(1)(1953, as amended).

-A-

criminal code.

These are traditionally regarded as "scienter"

requirements for the commission of a crime.

Third, the operation

of

aimed

the

tax

stamp

statutes

retribution and deterrence.
imposed

as

taxes

and

is obviously

at

promoting

The extremely large amounts of money

penalties

are

obviously

aimed

at

discouraging people from engaging in illegal drug transactions.
The

drug

stamp

retribution

taxes

against

and

those

penalties
who

also

break

the

act
law.

as a

form of

Fourth,

as

previously discussed, the behavior to which these proceedings
apply is already a crime.

Finally, there is no relationship

between the amount of the tax and penalty and civil-type damages
that

are sustained

as a result of

illegal drug manufacture,

production, shipment, transportation, importation or possession.

Utah Code Annotated §76-2-103 (1953, as amended) defines the
mental states required for the commission of a crime.
That
statute provides in part:
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or
willfully with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when
it is his conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with
respect to his conduct or to circumstances
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of
the nature of his conduct or the existing
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or
with knowledge, with respect to a result of
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct
is reasonably certain to cause the result.

-5-

The factors from Mendoza-Martinez, supra, indicate that
the

illegal drug

tax

criminal in nature.

stamp

proceedings

are

at

least quasi-

Furthermore, the other factors relied upon

in Ward are also instructive.

The civil and criminal

illegal

drug stamp tax statutes were enacted at the same time.

Those

civil and criminal provisions are found under the same title and
in the same chapter of the Utah code.
provisions

Finally, the daily penalty

in Ward were found to relate to the cost of toxic

waste clean-up.

The tax and penalty under the illegal drug stamp

tax

on

are

based

the

type

and

quantity

of

drug

and

are

indistinguishable from a fine.
sentencing

guidelines

are

Indeed, fines under the federal
determined in the same manner.7

Consequently, under the analysis employed in Ward the proceedings
at issue here would be regarded as quasi-criminal in nature.
Appellee's obvious purpose in making the argument that
these are civil proceedings is to avoid the implications of the
holding

of One Plymouth

Sedan v. Pennsylvania,

380 U.S. 693

Q

(1965).
forfeiture

In One Plymouth Sedan the Supreme Court held that civil
proceedings

were

"quasi-criminal"

in

nature

and

The federal sentencing reform act of 1984 established guideline
sentencing. In drug cases, the "offense level" is determined by
the type and quantity of the controlled substance (Guideline
§2Dl.l(a)(3)).
That "offense level" determines the range of
applicable fines (Guideline §5E1.2(c)(3)).
o

The importance of that case was argued by appellant in its
opening brief but was not cited or discussed by appellee.

-6-

subject

to the Fourth Amendment

exclusionary

rule*

This was

because the civil penalty of forfeiture could be imposed only if
there was proof that the claimant had violated the law.
Court

also found

importance

The

in the fact that the penalty of

forfeiture could be substantially greater than the potential fine
for the criminal conviction of the underlying offense.

Under

those circumstances, the court found that it was anomalous to
exclude the evidence in the criminal proceeding, but admit that
same evidence to prove those facts in the forfeiture proceeding.
Applying the analysis from One Plymouth Sedan, the tax
stamp proceedings fall into this "quasi-criminal" category.

The

tax commission must have proof that the defendant violated the
law to be able to impose the drug stamp tax and penalty.
the

assessment

there

must

also

be

proof

that

the

To make
criminal

provisions of Utah Code Annotated §59-19-106(2)(1053, as amended)
have

been

violated.

Furthermore,

inherent

in

proof

of

a

violation of Utah Code Annotated §59-19-106(2)(1953, as amended)
g
would be proof of a criminal controlled substances offense.
In
this case the tax and penalty assessed was $394,106.
fine and assessment

for the second degree

appellant was charged was $12,500.

The maximum

felony with which

The tax stamp proceedings

clearly fall within the "quasi-criminal" category described in
One

Plymouth

Sedan.

Consequently,

the

Fourth

Amendment

exclusionary rule should apply to these proceedings.
Q

See generally, Utah Code Annotated §58-37-8 (1953, as amended).

-7-

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE HAS
BEEN
APPLIED
TO
CIVIL
ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS.
In conjunction with this first argument

advanced by

appellee is the claim that the exclusionary rule does not apply
to civil proceedings.

In making this argument, appellee first

addresses the history and development of the exclusionary rule.
In this discussion appellee fails to discuss several important
cases.

Appellee

does

Pennsylvania, supra.

not

mention

One

Plymouth

that

decision

v.

As previously discussed, that case applied

the exclusionary rule to civil forfeiture proceedings.
for

Sedan

was

that

forfeiture

The basis

is a "quasi-criminal"

proceeding.
The other
appellee
Camera

important

line of cases not mentioned by

are those dealing with administrative

v. Municipal

Court,

387 U.S. 523

searches.

(1967),

In

the Fourth

Amendment warrant requirement was applied to health and safety
inspections.

Likewise,

States, 429 U.S. 338

in G.M.

Leasing

Corp. v. United

(1977), the Court held that

IRS agents

executing a levy for a jeopardy tax assessment could not enter
the petitioner's business and seize assets and records without a
warrant or exigent circumstances.

-LU

These cases belie appellee's

See also;
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) and
Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).

-8-

assertion that the protections of the Fourth Amendment have never
been applied to civil cases.
Appellee also listed several situations where state and
federal courts have declined to apply the exclusionary rule. One
commentator has listed a number of administrative hearings where
the rule has been applied:
Courts have held or at least assumed
that the exclusionary rule is applicable in a
wide variety of administrative proceedings,
including
FTC
hearings
to
uncover
discriminatory pricing practices,
SEC

1

J

Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d
530 (7th Cir. 1968); FTC v. Page, 378 F.Supp.
1052 (N.D.Ga. 1974)(distinguishing Supreme
court's ruling in Calandra that exclusionary
rule not applicable to grand jury witness, as
here n[n]o investigative proceedings will be
interrupted by consideration of respondents'
Fourth Amendment arguments at this point").

-q-

proceedings,
OSHA proceedings,
proceedings before the public utilities
commission to terminate phone service because
of illegal use, T141 NLRB hearings concerning
labor
controversies,
immigration

Tl2l
L

J

OKC Corp. v. Williams, 461 F.Supp. 540
(N.D.Tex. 1978); judgment aff'd, 614 F.2d 58
(5th Cir.).
[13]
Savina
Home
Industries„
Inc. v.
Secretary^of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir.
1979)(noting
that
the
Barlow's
case,
discussed in §10.2(a), did not resolve the
issue because there no OSHA search had yet
taken place). Consider also Weyerhaeuser Co.
v. Marshall,
592 F.2d
373
(7th Cir.
1979)(company
can
seek
suppression
in
district court notwithstanding fact OSHA
administrative proceedings still pending;
exhaustion of administrative remedies not
required here, "as counsel for the Secretary
informed us at oral argument that the OSHA
Review Commission has never ruled on the
issue of a warrant's validity").
See also
Trant, OSHA and the Exclusionary Rule:
Should the Employer Go Free Because the
Compliance Officer Has Blundered", 1981 Duke
L.J. 667; Annot., 67 A.L.R.Fed. "724 (1984);
Comments, 64 Minn.L.Rev. 789 (1980); 19 Wake
Forest L.Rev. 819 (1983).
Tl4l
Goldin v. Public Utilities Comm., 23
Cal.3d 638, 153 Cal.Rptr. 802, 592 P.2d 289
(1979).
^ 15 ^ NLRB v. Bell Oil & Gas Co., 98 F.2d 870
(5th Cir. 1938).

-i n -

hearings. *• ^ hearings to terminate a public
employee's government service, [17] hearings
to suspend or revoke a license to practice a

UOJ

Wonq Chunq Che v. Imm:Lqration and
Natu ralization Service f 565 F.2d 166 (1st
Cir. 1977); Schenk ex rel. Chow Fook Ho:nq v.
See
Ward , 24 F.Supp. 776 (D.Mass. 1938).
Frag omen, Procedural .Aspects__ of 11 legal
Search and Seizure in Deportation Cases, 14
San Diego L.Rev. 151 (1976); Annot., 44
A.L.R.Fed.
933
(1979);
Comment,
14
U.C.Davis.L.Rev.
955
(1981);
Note
58
N.Car.L.Rev. 647 (1980).
But see text at
note 98 infra.
[171
1
J
Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634
(D.C.Cir. 1966); Sullivan v. District Ct. of
Hampshire, 384 Mass. 736, 429 N.E.2d 335
(1981)("Illegally obtained evidence may not
be used by the government in a Civil Service
Commission
proceeding
to
support
the
discharge of a public employee");
City of
New Brunswick v. Speights, 157 N.J.Super. 9,
384 A.2d 225 (1978).
But see People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 12, 412
N.T.S.2d 801, 385 N.Y.S.2d 801, 385 N.E.2d
541 (1978) (under the "length of the road"
part
of
the
fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree
analysis used by the Supreme Court in the
Ceccolini case, discussed in §11.4(i), the
fact the evidence was offered in such a
proceedings is relevant because it shows it
is somewhat less likely that suppression is
needed as a deterrent).

-ii-

ri8i
L

ri9i
l

J

profession
or to sell liquor
and
hearings to suspend or expel a student from a
L
J
public
high
school
or
a
state
[21]
university.
LeFave, Search and Seizure, §1.7(e) at p. 159 (1987).
One

of

the

cases

cited

by

appellee,

Tirado

v.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 689 F.2d 307 (2nd Cir. 1982),
specifically
application

rejected
of

the

the

civil-criminal

exclusionary

rule.

distinction
In Tirado

in

the

the court

indicated that a number of factors must be explored to determine
if the exclusionary

rule applied

Those factors include:

to a particular proceeding.

whether the officers had an interest in

[181
Elder v. Board of Medical Examiners, 241
Cal.App.2d
489f
50
Cal.Rptr.
304
(1966)(questioned in Pierce v. Board of
Nurs i nq Educat ion,
255 Cal.App.2d 558r 63
Cal.Rptr. 107 (1967); Yarbrouqh v. Pfeiffer,
370 So.2d 1177 (Fla.App. 1979).
[191
L
J
Finn's Liquor Shop v. State Liquor
Authority, 24 N.Y.2d 647, 301 N.Y.S.2d 584,
249 N.E.2d 440 (1969);
Leoqrande v. State
Liquor Authority, 25 A.D.2d 225, 268 N.Y.S.2d
433 (1966);
Board of Comm'rs v. Pastore,
R.I.
, 463 A.2d 161 (1983).
1
J
Jones v. Latexo Independent School
District, 499 F.Supp. 223 (E.D.Tex. 1980);
Caldwell
v.
Cannady,
340
F.Supp.
835
(N.D.Tex. 1972).
^ 21 ^ Smyth v. Lubber, 389 F.Supp. 777
(W.D.Mich.1975);
Moore v. Student Affairs
Committee of Troy State University, 284
F.Supp. 725 (M.D.Ala. 1968).

-12-

the

proceeding

at

issue,

if

that proceeding

was within the

officers predictable contemplation, if that potential proceeding
motivated

the

officers'

actions,

and

if

there

understanding or collusion between the two bodies.

was

any

The court in

Tirado concluded its analysis stating,
. . . the exclusionary rule can be properly
and beneficially applied in those civil
proceedings where it has a realistic prospect
of achieving marginal deterrence.
689 F.2d at 314.
The bright

line civil-criminal distinction urged by

appellee fails to correctly reflect the state of the law. This
22
court needs to look to the nature of the proceedings
or the
23
policies that support the exclusionary rule.
Point

I, A., supra,

these proceedings

As discussed in

are quasi-criminal

nature and the exclusionary rule should apply to them.
I, C ,

in

In Point

infra, it will be shown that the policies underlying the

exclusionary rule require that

it be applied to illegal drug

stamp tax proceedings.
THE POLICIES THAT JUSTIFY THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE REQUIRE ITS APPLICATION TO THE ILLEGAL
DRUG TAX STAMP PROCEEDINGS.

One Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, supra.
23

Janis v. United States, 480 U.S. 433 (1976);
Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
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INS v. Lopez-

The

exclusionary

constitutional
violations.

rule was originally

requirement

that

attached

to

regarded

Fourth

as a

Amendment

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).

The

Court in Weeks found that without this remedy there would be no
protections

against Fourth Amendment

violations.

In Mapp v.

Ohio, 367 U.S. 643

(1961), the Court held that two policies

justified the rule.

The first justification was the need to

deter unlawful police conduct by making the evidence seized in
violation

of

the Fourth

Amendment

inadmissible.

The second

justification was the need to preserve judicial integrity.

The

Court reasoned that the judiciary should not be in a position of
condoning

Fourth

Amendment

violations

seized as a result of those violations.

by

admitting

evidence

Subsequently, in United

States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), the court indicated that
the exclusionary

rule was a judicial

remedy

and

its primary

purpose was to deter law enforcement from violating the Fourth
Amendment.
Appellee argues that judicial integrity is not a policy
that should be considered
exclusionary rule.

to justify

the application

of the

There is no question that the United States

Supreme Court has recently downplayed or even disregarded the
importance of that policy in determining the application of the
exclusionary
(1984).

rule.

See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897

However; this court

reasserted

its

importance

as a

justification for the exclusionary rule in State v. Arroyo, 796
P.2d 684 (Utah 1990).

In Arroyo, this court stated,

A further purpose of the exclusionary rule
implicated here, as enunciated in Terry v.
Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968) , is to prevent
making a court a "party to lawless invasions
of the constitutional rights of citizens by
permitting unhindered governmental use of the
fruits of such invasions."
796 P.2d at 689.

This policy of judicial integrity also prevents

the

the

erosion

of

courts'

ability

to

enforce

individual

liberties.
The second purpose

for the exclusionary

deter unlawful police conduct.
deterrence
evidence

of

such

illegally

conduct
seized.

Appellee

if the

rule

is to

argues there

is no

tax commission

Appellee

first

claims

suppresses
that

the

suppression of evidence in the criminal proceeding is sufficient
deterrence.

Second, appellee contends that the tax commission

has no authority

to control

the actions of police officers.

Third, appellee argues that the officers do not directly benefit
from their misdeeds.

Finally, appellee asserts that litigating

search and seizure claims will be unduly burdensome to the tax
commission and this court.
In support of this last assertion, appellee cites INS
v. Lopez-Mendoza, supra.

In that case, the Supreme Court held

that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable to deportation cases.
One of the reasons given for that holding was the burden created
by requiring immigration judges to litigate search and seizure
issues.

Immigration judges heard a very large number of cases

and the proceedings were

relatively simple.
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The same thing

cannot be said for tax stamp proceedings.

In this case appellant

is faced with a tax liability of nearly $400,000.
number

of

conferences

administrative

and

hearings

before

There were a
a

law-trained

law judge prior to that judge's decision being

submitted to the tax commission

for approval.

Requiring that

judge to make decisions on Fourth Amendment issues will not cause
the same kinds of problems as would occur in the
hearings in Lopez-Mendoza. 24

immigration

As for the question of deterrence, the critical factor
is

that

Amendment

the

State

reaps

violations.

a

substantial

benefit

from

Fourth

Under the current statute, the agency

involved in the seizure receives sixty percent of the taxes and
penalty collected. 25
If the state or the particular agency is
able to benefit
encouraged.

from the violation, such violations would be

Appellee argues that the provisions of Utah Code

Annotated §59-19-105(6)(1953, as amended) were not in effect at
the time of this stop.

However, the

existence of that statute

should be a substantial factor for this court to consider in
determining

if

the

exclusionary

rule

should

apply

to these

24
Appellee contends that there may be added litigation in the
courts, as a result of applying the exclusionary rule to the tax
stamp proceedings. However, if the exclusionary rule does not
apply, those who are the subjects of the tax may opt to file
Civil Rights actions claiming Fourth Amendment violations. The
drug stamp tax and penalty could be claimed as damages. Thus,
the burden on our judicial system may be increased.
25
Utah Code Annotated §59-19-105(6)(1953, as amended).

proceedings.

Appellee also claims that the tax commission is not

in a position to effect the actions of local law enforcement.
However, if law enforcement officers were aware that the state
would not benefit from Fourth Amendment violations, they would
certainly be deterred form committing those violations.
Furthermore, when the nature of the drug

tax stamp

proceedings is considered in light of the factors discussed in
the Tirado case, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule
can be seen.

Appellant was stopped and the drugs were found on

July 27, 1988.
the

notice

(R. 153)
and

demand

On August 30, 1988, he was served with
for

payment.

(R.

257-258)

The

information regarding the drug seizure was relayed to the tax
commission by the Juab County Attorney.

(R. 60)

These factors

tend to indicate that the drug stamp tax proceedings were within
the officer's contemplation at the time of the stop.

These facts

also indicate there is some degree of collusion between the local
law enforcement officials and the tax commission.

Consequently,

there would be a deterrent effect in applying the exclusionary
rule to the illegal drug tax stamp proceedings before the state
tax commission.
POINT II
ARTICLE
I,
SECTION
14
OF
THE
UTAH
CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
BE APPLIED TO ILLEGAL DRUG TAX STAMP
PROCEEDINGS.
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Appellant

argued

in

its

opening

brief

that

the

exclusionary rule applicable to violations of Article I, Section
14 of the Utah Constitution should be applied in this case. 26
Appellee did not respond to this argument.
794 P.2d

460

In State v. Larocco,

(Utah 1990), this court held

that there

is an

exclusionary rule for law enforcement violations of Article I,
Section 14.

This court specifically left several issues open

with respect to that rule.

The court stated,

Thus, the significant questions which must be
answered
by
state
courts
considering
independent state exclusionary rules are "(1)
whether
the state
courts consider
the
exclusionary rule to be a constitutional
requirement;
(2) whether state courts view
deterrence as the only purpose behind the
rule; and (3) which governmental officials
are deemed to be the target of this
deterrence." [citation ommitted]
794 P.2d at 473.
These
court

regards

issues are applicable to this case.
the

exclusionary

rule

as

a

If this

constitutional

requirement rather than a judicial remedyr then the rule would
certainly apply to any criminal or civil proceedings to which the
government is a party.
courts

had

exclusionary

held
rule

As pointed out in Larocco, several state

prior
was

to
a

Mapp

state

v.

Ohio,

supra,

constitutional

See Point II. D. of appellant's opening brief.
See, State v. Larocco, supra, at 472.

that

the
requirement. 27

Those decisions relied heavily on the policy that the courts
should not be a party to the unlawful actions of police officers
by admitting the results of those actions into evidence.

State

v. Arrequi, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927); Gore v. State, 24
Okla.Crim. 394, 218 P. 545 (1923).
That same reasoning should be applied by this court to
these proceedings.

Evidence that was seized as a result of the

officers' unlawful activities should not be allowed to be used in
any manner.
unlawful

To allow such use, this court is condoning those

actions.

Furthermore,

if the

exclusionary

rule is

inapplicable here, this court would allow the state to receive a
substantial financial benefit as a result of its agents violating
the state constitution.

Consequently, this court should rule

that the exclusionary rule is a constitutional requirement rather
than a judicial remedy.
These same arguments also apply to the second issue
discussed

in Larocco, whether deterrence

behind the exclusionary rule.

is the only purpose

The policy of deterrence described

in Janis and Lopez-Mendoza, should not be regarded as the only
purpose

of

the

state

constitutional

exclusionary

rule.

As

previously noted, in discussing the issue of the fruits of a
Fourth Amendment violation, this court relied on the policy of
judicial integrity as a purpose of the exclusionary rule.
v. Arroyo, supra.

Furthermore,

refusing

State

to acknowledge

the

importance of the judicial integrity policy would "relegate the
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judiciary to the periphery"
Amendment.

in the enforcement of the Fourth

United States v. Leon, supra, at 931 (Brennan, J.f

dissenting).
One commentator addressed the issue of deterrence being
the only policy justifying the exclusionary rulef stating,
The response to the view that the fourth
amendment restricts only privacy violations
by government agents who perform the actual
invasion is that the amendment restricts
governmental power as a whole.
Thusf the
scope
of
the
amendment
includes
administrative,
executive
and
judicial
action.
When a judge admits illegally
obtained
evidence,
he
completes
the
governmental action prohibited by the fourth
amendment. The possession by the government
of illegally obtained evidence is meaningless
unless it is admitted by a trial judge. It
is only by police and judge acting in
concert, as evidence-gatherers and evidenceadmitter, that a constitutional violation can
have a legal effect.
Because searches and
seizures are executed in order to bring
"proof to the aid of the Government," and
because such evidence is of no value unless
admitted by a trial judge, in order for the
fourth amendment to have any effect "police
and the courts cannot be regarded as
constitutional strangers to each other." The
significance
of
the
exclusionary
rule,
therefore, largely lies in the fact that it
serves to protect
constitutional
rights
without the need for judicial intervention.
The threat of the exclusion of unlawfully
obtained evidence makes enforcement of fourth
amendment rights at least partially selfexecuting, [footnotes ommitted]
Note, The Future of the Exclusionary Rule and the Development of
State Constitution Law, 1987 Wis.L.Rev. 377 at 393-394.

There are several other problems with the deterrence,
cost/benefit analysis advanced in Janis and Lopez-Mendoza.

The

most important of which is the nature of the fundamental right
that is at issue:
The individual rights provided in the
Constitution
are
among
the
fundamental
principles of our system of government, and
embody our conception of the relation of the
individual to the government. These rights
are vital ends in themselves, and our
government exists in part, to protect these
rights. Because of their fundamental nature,
they cannot be means to more important ends.
But recent United States Supreme Court
decisions,
by
using
a
cost/benefit
methodology,
have
subordinated
these
fundamental ends to lesser ends, such as
administrative
efficiency.
Implicit
in
employing
a
cost/benefit
analysis
in
adjudicating questions of individual rights
lies the notion that these rights have an
instrumental, and not fundamental, value.
This methodology poses a danger to the future
vitality
of
individual
rights.
The
fundamental
nature
of
these
rights,
therefore,
should
preclude
use
of
a
cost/benefit methodology in deciding cases
directly
concerning
individuals
rights,
[footnote ommitted]
Note, 1987 Wis.L.Rev., supra, at 394.
The other
Lopez-Mendoza

problem

with

the

reasoning

in Janis and

is that it fails to account for the changes in

attitudes of law enforcement and the judiciary with respect to
the Fourth Amendment.
1988) the court

In State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553 (N.C.

refused

to apply the "good

described in Leon to its exclusionary rule.

faith" exception

Some of the reasons

given were that the court felt the exclusionary rule has resulted
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in more training for police and judges being more careful in
scrutinizing
"deterrence

search

warrants

affidavits.

only" analysis of the exclusionary

account for these factors.
from

and supporting

the

exclusionary

The

rule fails to

Based on these factors, the benefits

rule

cannot

be

quantified.

It

is

impossible to determine how many bad searches have been avoided
based on the change in judicial attitudes and police education.
The third of these issues, the scope of the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule, was discussed at length in point
I.C., supra.

Those same arguments would apply to the deterrent

effects of the exclusionary rule of Article I, Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution.
This court should rule that the exclusionary rule of
Article

I,

Section

constitutional
remedy.

requirement

Furthermore,

deterrence.

14

the

of

the

rather

Utah
than

purposes

Constitution
a

of

judicially

the

rule

go

is

a

created
beyond

Those purposes should also include the integrity of

the judicial system and a prohibition on the state receiving
financial benefits from violations of Article
Finally,

there

is a deterrent

effect

on

I, Section 14.

the actions of law

enforcement officers if the exclusionary rule is applied to the
illegal drug tax stamp proceedings.
Section

14

exclusionary

rule

Consequently, the Article I,
should

be

regarded

as

constitutional requirement and be applied to these proceedings.
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a

POINT III
THE ROADBLOCK STOP WAS CONDUCTED IN VIOLATION
OF BOTH ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
Appellee refused to address the issues related to the
constitutional violations.28
In State v. Sims, 156 U.A.R. 8
(Ut.App.

1991),

the

court

of

appeals

reversed

appellant's

criminal conviction.

That court found violations of both the

Fourth

of Article

Amendment

Constitution.
suppression

and
The

hearing

evidence
in

the

If

Section

that

was

criminal

14 of

introduced

case

was

at

entered

evidence in this case as part of the stipulated facts.
213)

the Utah
the
into

(R. 146-

Based on the ruling of the court of appeals, this court

should find that the roadblock

in question violated both the

Fourth

I,

Amendment

and

Article

Section

14

of

the

Utah

Constitution.
CONCLUSION
This court should hold that the exclusionary rule is
applicable to the proceedings before the State Tax Commission on
the illegal drug stamp tax.

This case should be remanded to the

Tax Commission with orders that the Tax Commission
exclusionary
constitutional

rule

and

violations

comply

with

the

as was determined

appeals.
28
See, Brief of Appellee at p. 4.
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ruling
by

apply the
on

the

the court of
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